Management is buying/committing capital at a price it says the market itself just set against it — cheapness measured ag
The model's full reasoning — Q1 2016 call → NOWe need to determine if management describes deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is mispricing what it already has. Look for concrete mispricing claim and action. In the transcript, Mike Fries discusses share buybacks. He says: "we were meaningfully restricted on the buybacks in the first quarter. Most of you probably know that, due to the cable and wireless transaction, so we were only able to repurchase $286 million worth of stock. Needless to say, we expect to restart our buyback program next week, after that deal closes. And we're likely to accelerate that activity in the weeks and months ahead." That's a plan to buy back shares, but is there a claim that the shares are undervalued? He doesn't explicitly say the market is mispricing. He says "we're excited" and "we'll be back in the market with share repurchases." No concrete anchor to a valuation gap. Also, he mentions "we plan on repurchasing $3.7 billion of our shares" by end of 2017. But no statement that the shares are undervalued relative to something concrete. There is also discussion about LiLAC distribution, but that's about distributing shares, not buying. No mention of mispricing. So answer NO.
| Ticker | Company | Call | Date | Call grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESEA | Euroseas Ltd. | Q4 2022 | 2023-02-15 | C+ |
| CTHR | Charles & Colvard, Ltd. | Q1 2023 | 2022-11-06 | F |
| SBGI | Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. | Q3 2022 | 2022-11-02 | C |
| WD | Walker & Dunlop, Inc. | Q2 2022 | 2022-08-09 | C+ |
| TWO | Two Harbors Investment Corp. | Q2 2022 | 2022-08-04 | C+ |
TWO · Q2 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the mispricing to concrete, verifiable levels: mortgage spreads at “historically wide” levels (125–150 bp ZV/OAS, far above the non-QE average and the March 31 levels), RMBS coupons now trading at a wide range (2 %–5.5 %) with 300 bp “out-of-the-money” low-coupon pools and 97 bp OAS–ZV spread differential on higher-coupon names.
ESEA · Q4 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the undervaluation claim to a concrete, verifiable figure: their own estimate of the fleet’s market value at $666 million (derived from charter-adjusted values and market changes, incorporating the Aegean Express incident), which produces a net asset value of $344 million or >$48 per share.
WD · Q2 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the undervaluation claim to a concrete benchmark: CoStar trades at ~30x EBITDA while W&D trades at under 10x despite identical revenue and EBITDA growth rates over 5–10 years. They explicitly state there is “plenty of multiple expansion available to W&D.