Management is buying/committing capital at a price it says the market itself just set against it — cheapness measured ag
The model's full reasoning — Q2 2018 call → NOWe need to determine if management describes deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. The key is: management asserts that the value assigned to the company or its assets is materially below what it's worth, grounded in something concrete, and the company is acting on it with real resources already in motion. Looking at the transcript: Management discusses asset sales, divestitures, and investor-friendly equity. They talk about selling assets at high multiples, e.g., Elizabethtown at 37 times earnings, Florida assets at high multiples. They say these sales are accretive because they sell above current valuation. But that's about selling, not acquiring or retaining. They also mention issuing equity to fund Vogtle, but that's dilution. They talk about "investor-friendly sources of funds" and "additional investor-friendly equity" but that's about raising capital, not buying back. The question: Does management convey that outsiders are valuing the company or its assets too low, and the company is responding by acquiring, retaining, or concentrating that exposure? Management says they have been disciplined buyers and sellers, and they think some assets are undervalued in their current valuation. For example, they say "we think we've got an argument anyway that a lot of our assets are undervalued in our current valuation." But do they act on that by retaining or buying more? They are selling assets, not buying. They are issuing equity, not repurchasing. They are not concentrating exposure; they are divesting. The only thing they retain is the core business, but they are not deliberately taking on more exposure because of mispricing. They are selling to raise capital at high prices, which is the opposite of taking on more exposure. The essence: an operating team that has looked at an outside price for what it owns, concluded the outside world is wrong, and is putting the company's own money behind that judgment while the gap is still open. Here, they are selling at high prices, not buying. They are not committing resources to acquire underpriced assets; they are monetizing at what they consider high prices. So the answer is NO. Thus, answer NO.
| Ticker | Company | Call | Date | Call grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESEA | Euroseas Ltd. | Q4 2022 | 2023-02-15 | C+ |
| CTHR | Charles & Colvard, Ltd. | Q1 2023 | 2022-11-06 | F |
| SBGI | Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. | Q3 2022 | 2022-11-02 | C |
| WD | Walker & Dunlop, Inc. | Q2 2022 | 2022-08-09 | C+ |
| TWO | Two Harbors Investment Corp. | Q2 2022 | 2022-08-04 | C+ |
TWO · Q2 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the mispricing to concrete, verifiable levels: mortgage spreads at “historically wide” levels (125–150 bp ZV/OAS, far above the non-QE average and the March 31 levels), RMBS coupons now trading at a wide range (2 %–5.5 %) with 300 bp “out-of-the-money” low-coupon pools and 97 bp OAS–ZV spread differential on higher-coupon names.
ESEA · Q4 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the undervaluation claim to a concrete, verifiable figure: their own estimate of the fleet’s market value at $666 million (derived from charter-adjusted values and market changes, incorporating the Aegean Express incident), which produces a net asset value of $344 million or >$48 per share.
WD · Q2 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the undervaluation claim to a concrete benchmark: CoStar trades at ~30x EBITDA while W&D trades at under 10x despite identical revenue and EBITDA growth rates over 5–10 years. They explicitly state there is “plenty of multiple expansion available to W&D.