Management is buying/committing capital at a price it says the market itself just set against it — cheapness measured ag
The model's full reasoning — Q4 2017 call → NOWe need to determine if management describes deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. The key is a present-tense mispricing anchored to something concrete, and the company acting on it with real resources. Looking at the transcript, there is a section about TCAP (Triangle Capital Corporation). Josh Easterly says: "Over the course of Q4, we purchase approximately 1.4 million shares of Triangle Capital Corporation of approximately 3% of the company's shares outstanding, at a weighted average price per share of approximately $9.70 or 0.73 three times, the company has been reporting net asset value per share, which we believe provides a margin of safety for our investment." That is a concrete anchor: they bought at 0.73 times NAV, which is a discount to net asset value. They believe it provides a margin of safety. They are acquiring shares of another company, not their own, but it's an investment. The question is about "its own economic exposure" - meaning the company's own assets or shares? The phrasing: "the company DELIBERATELY TAKING ON MORE OF ITS OWN ECONOMIC EXPOSURE BECAUSE IT BELIEVES THE OUTSIDE WORLD IS CURRENTLY MISPRICING WHAT IT ALREADY HAS" - that could be interpreted as the company taking on more exposure to its own assets or to assets it already has. But here they are buying shares of another company, TCAP, which is not their own asset. However, they are taking on exposure to TCAP, which they believe is undervalued. But the question is about "what it already has" - meaning the company's own existing assets or shares. They are not buying their own shares; they are buying another company's shares. So that might not fit. Alternatively, consider if they are retaining or concentrating exposure to their own portfolio? They mention they are not selling assets, but they are not necessarily buying more of the same. They did have net fundings in Q4, but that's normal lending activity. The TCAP purchase is an equity investment in another BDC. They believe TCAP is undervalued relative to NAV. That is a mispricing claim with a concrete anchor (NAV). And they are acting on it by buying shares.
| Ticker | Company | Call | Date | Call grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ESEA | Euroseas Ltd. | Q4 2022 | 2023-02-15 | C+ |
| CTHR | Charles & Colvard, Ltd. | Q1 2023 | 2022-11-06 | F |
| SBGI | Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. | Q3 2022 | 2022-11-02 | C |
| WD | Walker & Dunlop, Inc. | Q2 2022 | 2022-08-09 | C+ |
| TWO | Two Harbors Investment Corp. | Q2 2022 | 2022-08-04 | C+ |
TWO · Q2 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the mispricing to concrete, verifiable levels: mortgage spreads at “historically wide” levels (125–150 bp ZV/OAS, far above the non-QE average and the March 31 levels), RMBS coupons now trading at a wide range (2 %–5.5 %) with 300 bp “out-of-the-money” low-coupon pools and 97 bp OAS–ZV spread differential on higher-coupon names.
ESEA · Q4 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the undervaluation claim to a concrete, verifiable figure: their own estimate of the fleet’s market value at $666 million (derived from charter-adjusted values and market changes, incorporating the Aegean Express incident), which produces a net asset value of $344 million or >$48 per share.
WD · Q2 2022 → YESThe question is whether management describes the company deliberately taking on more of its own economic exposure because it believes the outside world is currently mispricing what it already has. YES Management anchors the undervaluation claim to a concrete benchmark: CoStar trades at ~30x EBITDA while W&D trades at under 10x despite identical revenue and EBITDA growth rates over 5–10 years. They explicitly state there is “plenty of multiple expansion available to W&D.